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Abstract
In traditional tax literature it is argued that (further) integration among countries
will inevitably lead to a race to the bottom of corporate tax rates. In order to
attract firms, countries are assumed to lower their tax rates below the ones of their
’competitors’. According to the New Economic Geography literature this however
does not necessarily need to be the case. It is argued that more agglomerated regions
benefit from what is called agglomeration rents and that these rents can be taxed.
As integration moves on, one might expect the tax difference between more and less
agglomerated regions to increase instead of fading out. The purpose of this paper is
to test this theory for Belgian firms.
1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze the impact of corporate taxes on location decisions of firms
within Belgium. On the one hand, the foreign direct investment (FDI) literature has
shown that there is a negative relation between corporate taxes and attracting firms.
[De Mooij and Ederveen (2003)] show using a meta-analysis that a 1 percentage point
higher tax rate will lead to 3.3 percent less firms in a certain country or region. This
type of research is very popular and several studies come up with different tax elastic-
ities for FDI in different countries. Also the impact of taxation on entrepreneurship,
the formation of new businesses, has been studied before, although less than FDI. These
studies find that a 10 percentage point decease in the tax rate increases the entry rate
in a country by 0.88 to 1.3 percentage points ([Da Rin, Giacomo and Sembenelli (2008)];
[Djankov at al (2008)] and [Konings and Nursky (2008)]). On the other hand, the New
Economic Geography literature shows that more agglomerated regions benefit from ag-
glomeration rents. The idea is that firms benefit from locating close to one another because
of spillovers, because of being able to buy or sell intermediates at a more profitable rate
from/to each other, because of a better infrastructure and so on. As a consequence, more
agglomerated regions can impose higher corporate taxes without necessarily driving firms
away [Baldwin and Krugman (2004)]. This paper combines both strands of literature and
studies whether agglomerated forces reduces a firm’s sensitivity to tax rates.
Only three studies have studied this particular research question for regions in Switzer-
land [Brülhart, Jametti and Schmidheiny (2007)], municipalities in Catalonia [Solé-Ollé and Jofre-Mons
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and for regions in the UK [Devereux, Griffith and Simpson (2007)]. We test this hypoth-
esis using data of newly established firms in Belgium in 2006. Belgium has an interesting
setting to study. Although it is a small country, it is clear that it has large regional dif-
ferences. Belgium has three regions: Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia. In our study, we
will focus on the regions Flanders and Wallonia since its central location in Europe and
presence of international institutions will bias our results. Flanders is known worldwide as
a very industrialized region with high employment rates and a good developed infrastruc-
ture and transport network. Calculating agglomeration indices, we indeed observe that
Flanders is the most agglomerated region compared to Wallonia. Our results also indicate
that Flanders is able to attract more firms than Wallonia for a certain level of effective
tax rates. This means that other elements such as agglomeration rents attract firms to
Flanders irrespective of the tax rate. Moreover, we find that an equal rise in the effective
tax rate in both regions implies more firms to set up their activities in Flanders rather than
in Wallonia.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the taxation litera-
ture and the Belgian tax system. Section 3 describes the data and section 4 reports the
descriptive empirical results. Subsequently, section 5 introduces how we can set up future
research based on our results. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Literature overview
This section is split up in two subsections. The first subsection discusses the taxation liter-
ature related to firm location and agglomeration effects. The second subsection describes
the Belgian tax system.
2.1 Tax competition and agglomeration effects
In the taxation literature one often encounters the fear of a race to the bottom. In an
international tax competition context, the mobile factor bears too little of the tax bur-
den compared to the immobile factor. One argues that competition among countries in
order to attract firms will make them lower their taxes. This process will lower taxes such
that we eventually end up in a situation where taxes are more or less equalized to the tax
level of the country with the lowest taxes [Wilson (1999)]. Several empirical studies have
indeed shown that corporate taxes have a negative impact on attracting FDI. According
to a meta-study of [De Mooij and Ederveen (2003)], a decrease in the corporate tax rate
with 1 percentage point would lead to an increase in FDI by 3.3 percent. This negative
relation between taxes and FDI could indeed lead to a race to the bottom. Empirical
literature however has until now not observed such a race to the bottom - despite the fact
that firms have become more and more mobile ([Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002)];
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[Vandenbussche and Crabbé (2006)]). One possible reason why a universal lowering of tax
rates is not observed is provided by the new economic geography literature. This strand
of literature argues that increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition combined
with transport costs may cause agglomeration. If firms locate in a few regions, this ag-
glomeration generates benefits such as spillovers, presence of suppliers and buyers and
a more developed infrastructure [De Bruyne (2006)]. In a next step, more agglomerated
regions will be able to tax these agglomeration benefits without driving firms away. Sev-
eral authors provided theoretical support for the existence of taxable agglomeration rents.
[Ludema and Wooton (2000)] show indeed that as trade costs decrease, integration will at-
tenuate tax competition. [Andersson and Forslid (1999)] show that mobile factors will not
move if tax rates change only marginally, thus again indicating the existence of agglomer-
ation rents. [Kind, Midelfart-Knarvik and Schjelderup (2000)] also show that tax compe-
tition depends on trade costs and pecuniary externalities. [Baldwin and Krugman (2004)]
and [Borck and Pflüger (2006)] finally developed a core-periphery model with taxation.
The first paper is based on the core-periphery network, while the second one uses a model
yielding partial stable agglomeration in addition to the core-periphery outcome. Both
papers show that the tax differential between alternative locations is explained by the dif-
ference in their agglomeration patterns. The tax differential turns out to be a bell-shaped
function of trade integration since agglomeration rents are a bell-shaped function of trade
costs. Indeed, for respectively high and low trade costs one finds fairly low agglomeration
rents. For intermediate trade costs, agglomeration rents turn out to be highest. Therefore,
it is expected that the tax differential between the core of economic activity and the pe-
riphery is highest for intermediate trade costs. Indeed, for these intermediate trade costs
agglomeration rents in the centre are higher implying that taxes can be set at a higher level
in the centre compared to the periphery.
The central question in this paper is whether agglomeration rents reduce the sensitivity
of firms to tax differentials. From the basic tax competition models, we know that higher
corporate taxes act as a push factor for firms. The new economic geography, however,
states that agglomerated regions have agglomeration rents that may act as a pull factor
for firms - pulling firms to the centre of economic activity. The central question is then
whether location decisions of firms are less sensitive to higher corporate taxes because of
these agglomeration rents.
Several empirical studies have tackled the impact of agglomeration rents on tax levels
and the location decision of firms. [Brülhart, Jametti and Schmidheiny (2007)] find empiri-
cal evidence that firm births in Swiss municipalities on average react negatively to corporate
tax burdens, but that the deterrent effect of taxes is significantly weaker in sectors that
are more spatially concentrated. [Devereux, Griffith and Simpson (2007)] also investigated
the impact of agglomeration economies on the sensitivity to local fiscal incentives of firms’
location choices in the UK. More specifically, the authors dig into the effect of grants on
location decisions of firms. They find that grants have a small effect in attracting plants to
specific geographic areas, but that firms are less responsive to subsidies in areas where there
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are fewer existing plants in their industry - again confirming the existence of agglomera-
tion economies. [Solé-Ollé and Jofre-Monseny (2007)] show for Catalonia that taxes have
a negative impact on location. They observe that omitting agglomeration variables leads
to a severe underestimation of the negative effect of business taxes on location decisions.
[Charlot and Paty (2007)] finally estimate a derived tax-setting equation for French mu-
nicipalities. The authors confirm a positive and significant relationship between the tax
rate and market access, which suggests there is a taxable agglomeration rent in French
municipalities.
2.2 Belgian Tax system
In our paper, we want to focus on the Belgian case. Do we observe firm entry in Bel-
gian municipalities with higher agglomeration rents to be less sensitive to higher tax rates?
Corporate profit taxes are set at the federal level in Belgium. This means that the nom-
inal or statutory tax rate (STR) and taxable income are determined at the federal level
and thus the same for all large firms in Belgium1. While the STR is the same for all
firms, the effective tax rate (ETR) can differ across firms. The ETR is defined as the
ratio of firm level ‘tax liabilities’ in a particular year over the ‘reported income/profits’ in
that same year. This definition is widely used and known as the micro-backward method
since it uses firm level archival data ([Nicodème (2002)]; [Collins and Shackelford (2002)];
[Vandenbussche, Crabbé and Janssen (2006)]). The ETR or real tax burden of a firm can
differ across firms because of several reasons such as differences in efficiency levels of local
tax administration or tax rulings2 [Nicodème (2002)]. [Vandenbussche, Crabbé and Janssen (2006)]
provide empirical evidence that the effective tax rate of firms located in Flanders is signif-
icantly higher than the ETR of firms in Wallonia and Brussels when holding all other firm
or sector characteristics constant (ceteris paribus). Their study was carried out using large
Belgian firms for the period 1993-2002 (before the Belgian tax reform of 2003).
3 Data
For the purpose of our study, we use the number of new firms that have set up their activities
in each Belgian district in 2006. These data are retrieved from the Belfirst database which
comprises annual accounts of 250 000 Belgian firms. This database counts in total 8790 new
firms setting up their activity in 2006 - 6578 of them in Flanders and 2212 in Wallonia.
As a taxation variable we calculate the effective tax rate for existing firms in 2005. As
stated before, this effective tax rate is the amount of taxes paid divided by the profit
before tax. In order to calculate this variabe we need the amount of taxes paid and the
1The STR is 33.99% for Belgian firms with a taxable income above 322 500 euro. Firms with a lower
taxable income are subject to a progressive tax system (Van Kerckhove and Heirewegh, 2003).
2Firms can ask a tax ruling. This means that they can negotiate with the Belgian government about a
particular element in their tax liablity.
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Figure 1: Belgian districts
income of all firms that had activities in the different districts in 2005. We use data for
41328 Wallonian firms - after clearing out the firms for which one of both variables was
not available. For Flanders, we have 114776 firms in total. We opt for the effective tax
rate because it indicates what firms actually pay as stated in section 1. We argue that the
effective tax rate paid by existing firms in a region in the previous period may be a good
indication of the tax rate that new firms might have to pay. We also only take into account
observations with an ETR between 0 and 1, similar as in ([Gupta and Newberry (1997)];
[Collins and Shackelford (2002)]; [Vandenbussche, Crabbé and Janssen (2006)]).
We analyse the data for 42 Belgian districts - 22 in Flanders (Northern part of the
country) and 20 in Wallonia (Southern part of the country)3. Figure (1) illustrates the
location of all Belgian districts. We disregard Brussels since it attracts so many firms
because of reasons that have nothing to do with tax rates (eg the presence of a lot of inter-
national institutions). Moreover, we want to be able to make a clear distinction between
the Northern and the Southern part of the country and the presence of the Brussels dictrict
could misrepresent our findings. As we will illustrate, Flanders is more agglomerated than
Wallonia, so we might expect higher taxes to be less of an entry barrier for new firms in
that region compared to the other region.
3Appendix 1 lists the different districts
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4 Empirical results
The emprirical results can be divided in two parts. First of all we analyse in which dis-
tricts we observe the most agglomeration and therefore in which districts we may expect
agglomeration rents to be highest. Afterwards we plot the number of new firms against the
effective tax rate of 2005 for different districts in order to analyse wheter the relationship
is positive or negative.
4.1 Agglomeration indicators
There are several indicators af agglomeration used in the literature. We will focus our
attention on two of them. First, we calculate the number of firms per squared kilometer for
each district. This gives us an indication of the clustering of firms. However, the number
of firms per se does not necesarilly indicate the true location of economic activity. If there
are a lot of small firms present in a district it might mistakingly give the impression that
the district considered has a large part of the economic activity within its boundaries.
We therefore also use the number of employees per squared kilometer as an indicator of
agglomeration.
Figure (2) shows the number of firms per squared kilometer for the different Belgian
districts. The Flemish dictricts are represented by filled rectangles while the Walloon
districts are represented by white rectangles.The districts surrounding the Antwerp harbour
(Antwerp, Mechelen) and the districts in Flanders language valley (Kortrijk, Roeselare)
show the highest agglomeration. There are on average 13 firms per squared kilometer in
Flemish districts, while the average Wallonian district has 5 firms per squared kilometer.
In other words, the Flemish discricts are more agglomerated than the Wallonian districts.
Figure (3) reports the number of employees per squared kilometer for the different
Belgian districts. The same districts as in Figure (2) appear to be most agglomerated.
The average Flemish district has 140 employees per squared kilometer while the average
Walloon district has 72 employees per squared kilometer.
It is obvious from both figures that Flanders is more agglomerated than Wallonia. This
could imply a different impact of taxes on the location decision of firms. It could be the
case that a higher tax rate in Flanders is less of a problem than in Wallonia. Indeed, if
there are more agglomeration rents in Flanders, higher taxes would not necessarily imply
fewer firms to be attracted.
4.2 Effective tax rates and new firms setup
Figure (4) shows the effective tax rate for 2005 for the different Belgian districts. They
range between 22.5 and 26.5 percent. Moreover, the average effective tax rate in Flanders
is 24.5 percent and in Wallonia it is 25.2 percent. The tax difference between the regions
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Figure 2: Number of firms per squared km
Figure 3: Employment per squared km
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Figure 4: Effective tax rates 2005 Belgium
turns out to be small, but there is quite some variation in the tax rates within the regions.
The variation is clearly larger between the Wallonian districts. Figures (5) and (6) illustrate
this finding. Note that the effective tax rate is much lower than the statutory tax rate in
Belgium which is 33.99 %. [Vandenbussche, Crabbé and Janssen (2006)] also show that the
effective tax rates are much lower than the statutory tax rate because of tax exemptions
for example for investments.
Calculating the correlation coefficient between the effective tax rate and the agglomer-
ation indicators gives us a first insight in the possible existence of taxable agglomeration
rents. The correlation between the effective tax rate and the number of firms per squared
kilometer is 0.51, while the correlation between the effective tax rate and the number of
emplyees per squared kilometer is 0.53. These values are very high compared to results
for other countries in other papers. Coulibaly (2007) finds a correlation between an ag-
glomeration index and tax differences between agglomerated and peripheral regions to be
only 0.05 for Swiss municipalities. Sollé-Ollé and Jofre-Monseny (2007) find the correlation
between manufacturing employment and the tax rate to vary from 0.3 to 0.4 for Catalonian
municipalities.
Based on the New Economic Geography theory one might expect the more agglomerated
region - Flanders - to be able to set the highest tax rate. The fact that this is not the case
might be puzzling at first sight. However, a higher agglomeration in Flanders than in
Wallonia also implies that given a certain effective tax rate, the agglomeration rents in
Flanders are higher and given the tax rate Flanders will therefore most likely attract more
firms than Wallonia. We will indeed show that given a similar tax rate in both regions,
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Figure 5: Effective tax rates 2005 Flanders
Figure 6: Effective tax rates 2005 Wallonia
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Figure 7: Number of firms in 2006 as a function of ETR in 2005 in Flanders
Flanders attracts more firms than Wallonia. In order to corroborate this statement we first
need to introduce the set-up of new firms. We want to analyse the relationship between
new firms set up in 2006 and the effective tax rate that existing firms paid in 2005.
Figures (7) and (8) show the relationship between the number of new firms in 2006
and the effective tax rate in 2005 for all Flemish and Walloon districts respectively. Both
relationships are clearly positive indicating that regions with higher effective tax rates in
2005 attract more firms in 2006. This is an indication that agglomeration rents may indeed
play a role.
In order to compare both regions better, Figure (9) shows the results for both re-
gions combined. The spades indicate Walloon districts while the squares represent Flemish
districts. As stated before, it is obvious that both relationships are positive. A higher
corporate tax rate in the previous year implies more firms setting up their activities in
the district considered. This is an indication that agglomeration rents indeed play a role.
There are two noticable differences between the two regions however. First of all, the trend
line for Flanders is situated higher than the one for Wallonia. This implies that given a
certain level of the effective tax rate, Flanders attracts more firms than Wallonia. This
phenomenon can be explained because of the higher agglomeration - and therefore higher
agglomeration rents - in Flanders. Secondly, the slope of the Flemish trend line is steeper
than the one of Wallonia. This shows that an equal rise in the effective tax rate in both
regions implies more firms to set up their activities in Flanders rather than in Wallonia.
We can therefore conclude that the impact of both the level and the growth rate of the
effective tax rate on location outcomes is stronger in Flanders than in Wallonia
We do however observe outliers in both Flanders and Wallonia that may affect our
results. For Flanders, the district of Antwerp is the outlier. It is pretty obvious that the
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Figure 8: Number of firms in 2006 as a function of ETR in 2005 in Wallonia
district with the international harbour attracts most new firms - irrespective of the tax
rate. For Wallonia, Luik and Nijvel are obvious outliers. In order to analyse whether
these outliers affect our findings, we plot a similar figure but now excluding the districts
of Antwerp, Nijvel and Luik. Figure (10) shows the results. We can conclude that our
main finding remains the same even if we exclude the outliers. Both relationships remain
positive and there is indeed an indication of higher agglomeration rents in Flanders. The
difference between both regions becomes even larger as the effective tax rate increases.
One last robustness check concerns loss-making firms. Our dataset indeed also includes
firms that make losses which might affect our results. We therefore recalculated the effective
tax rate excluding firms that make losses. Of course we find on average a slightly higher
effective tax rate in both regions. All our other findings however remain the same. The
relationship between the effective tax rate and the number of firms remains postive in both
regions (even more positive than before) ánd the impact of both the level and the growth
rate of the effective tax rate on location outcomes remains stronger in Flanders than in
Wallonia
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Figure 9: Number firms in 2006 as a function of ETR 2005 for Belgium




Our analysis thus far can be extended in many ways. First of all, instead of merely
interpreting the data we may estimate a LOGIT model explicitly analyzing the loca-
tion deciscion of firms. [Brülhart, Jametti and Schmidheiny (2007)] performed a similar
analysis for Switzerland introducing explicitly an interaction term between taxes and a
sector-specific measure of agglomeration. [Devereux, Griffith and Simpson (2007)] also use
a LOGIT model for UK firms but they face the problem that taxes in the UK may be sector
and/or region specific - a problem that [Brülhart, Jametti and Schmidheiny (2007)] did not
encounter for Switzerland. We will have to take this into account too when we estimate
the model for Belgium. [Solé-Ollé and Jofre-Monseny (2007)] for Catalonian municipalities
and [Charlot and Paty (2007)] for French districts performed similar analyses.
Another way to extend our research would be to verify our underlying assumption.
We assume that districts with higher agglomeration rents are faced with higher tax rates.
The high correlation coefficient between the two variables corroborates this assumption.
[Coulibaly (2007)] tests for Swiss municipalities whether higher agglomeration rents indeed
lead to higher tax differences between more agglomerated and more peripheral regions. A
similar analysis for Belgium would enhance the robustness of our results.
Finally, in future work we would like to allow for hetereogeneity of firms. As [Baldwin and Okubo (200
show, bigger firms are more likely to relocate in order to escape high-taxes imposed in the
big nation. Correcting for the size of the different firms that locate in Belgium it would
indeed be very interesting to find out whether larger firms are indeed more footloose.
6 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of corporate taxes on firm start-ups in
agglomerated regions. To study this research question we used data of newly established
firms in 2006 in 42 Belgian districts. Our results show that agglomeration rents indeed
play a role. The more agglomerated region - Flanders - attracts more firms than the less
agglomerated region - Wallonia. Both in terms of the effect of levels and growth rates of
the effective tax rate on location decisions of firms, Flanders outperforms Wallonia. For the
same level of the effective tax rate, Flanders will attract more firms. For a similar growth
rate of the effective tax rate, again Flanders will attract more firms than Wallonia. The
results of previous studies are therefore corroborated.
What does this imply from a policy point of view? We can first of all conclude that
although Flanders is able to set higher taxes - because of the higher agglomeration rents -
it doesn’t do so. Secondly, if Wallonia wants to attract more companies it has two options.
It could first of all try to turn the region in a more attractive location for firms - for
instance through investments in infrastructure - in order to increase the agglomeration
rents. Secondly, it could lower its taxes to compensate for the lower agglomeration rents.
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However, since corporate taxes in Belgium are determined at the federal level, Wallonia has
little flexibility in this area. Of course they could for instance use exemptions but ideally
they should be able to set their taxes locally. For Wallonia a regionalisation of corporate
tax rates might therefore be a good idea.
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